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Abstract Over the past few years, the Virtual Organization (VO) paradigm has been
emerging as an ideal solution to support collaboration among globally distributed
entities (individuals and/or organizations). However, due to rapid technological and
societal changes, there has also been an astonishing growth in technologies and
services for mobile users. This has opened up new collaborative scenarios where the
same participant can access the VO from different locations and mobility becomes a
key issue for users and services. The nomadicity and mobility introduces additional
challenges for managing collaboration in VO environments. This paper focuses on
the Identity Management challenge in a Mobile Dynamic VO environment, which is
a VO that takes into account nomadicity and seamless mobility aspects as elaborated
within the EU funded project Akogrimo (Access to Knowledge through the Grid in a
mobile world). The resulting work is the design of the Akogrimo Identity
Management system supporting the authentication and authorization process across
the different administrative domains of the Mobile Dynamic VO. This design
follows the service oriented approach and integrates the different perspectives: that
of the network, that of the user and that of the service provider. Such an integration
requires facing challenges; both from the architectural and technological viewpoints
because different ‘worlds’ (i.e. network and service level) leverage different (and
sometimes conflicting) approaches when addressing Identity Management.
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A4C Authentication, authorization, accounting, auditing, and charging
Akogrimo Access to Knowledge thrOugh the GRId in a Mobile wOrld
AVP Attribute-value-pair
BVO Base virtual organization
CD Customer domain
EAP Extensible authentication protocol
EMS Execution management group of services
GSI Globus security infrastructure
GT4 Globus toolkit 4
ID Identity document
IdM Identity management
MDVO Mobile dynamic virtual organization
MIPv6 Mobile IP version 6
MU Mobile user
ND Network provider domain
NGG Next generation grid
NGN Next generation network
NP Network provider
OASIS Advancing open standard for the information society
OGSA Open grid service architecture
OpVO Operative virtual organization





SLA Service level agreement
SM SOAP message
SP Service provider
SSO Single sign on





WSRF Web service resource framework
Introduction
Over the past few years, the Virtual Organization (VO) has been emerging as an
ideal paradigm to support large scale collaborations among independent, globally
distributed entities in order to achieve the VO goal. The enhancement of enabling
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technologies surrounding the VO vision (such as Web Service (WS), Semantic Web,
Grid, utility computing, cloud computing, network technologies) promoted the
definition of more ambitious goals aiming at the accomplishment of a unified and
integrated infrastructure to share ‘any kind’ of resource (computational, storage
facilities, virtual machine, software, etc.) connected through the network.
Several research communities have been working in order to overcome a number
of challenges that are obstructing the accomplishment of the VO paradigm.
A critical research issue is related to Identity Management (IdM) spanning across
globally distributed administrative domains.
IdM refers to the design of processes and systems that manage and control
identities in computer and in telecommunications systems. IdM includes authenti-
cation, trust establishment through identity authentication, authorization for access
control, exchange of identity attributes, identity lifecycle management, and finally
the federation of identities.
Different approaches exist to address the IdM challenge, which can be categorized
in the following three main models (FGIdM 2007):
& Isolated: this is the simplest case, where users own a dedicated identifier for each
service they access. Although this model simplifies the management of the
Service Provider (SP), from the users’ perspective, it becomes difficult to
manage as soon as the numbers of identifiers and related credentials increases.
Furthermore, processes across several SPs will add a huge administrative
overhead generated by the missing convergence.
& Federated: the basic idea is to allow the use of the same identifier in order to be
authenticated by a ‘federated’ group of SPs. This means that identifiers valid in
different SP domains are linked among them and accepted across multiple SPs.
Such an approach is feasible as far as the federated providers trust each other and
there is an efficient mechanism to map identities within the SP federation.
& Centralized: this model expects a single identifiers’ provider that is trusted by
several SPs. This model decouples the role of service and identifier providers,
which can be independent entities.
This paper discusses the design and implementation of a federated IdM
architecture for a Mobile Dynamic VO (MDVO) developed in the context of the
EU research project Akogrimo (Ako 2004). MDVOs are VOs whose members are
able to change locations while provided or consumed services remain available even
after temporary loss of reachability, and while running or yet to be initiated
workflows adapt to changed conditions, so that MDVOs are characterized by a
strong dynamic element with respect to their organizational composition and their
business processes (Stiller and Waldburger 2005). Dynamism and mobility are key
aspects of a MDVO and they introduce challenging requirements in management of
identities spanning across several independent administrative domains.
The basic principles underpinning the Akogrimo IdM system have been
introduced in previous articles (Hasan et al. 2007; Kirkham et al. 2005, 2007).
Here, we will detail and extend previous work, stepping forward through the
presentation of past results in terms of implementation and validation.
The remainder of this paper is as follow: firstly, we present a scenario to clarify the
requirements to be met by the IdM architecture together with an overview of the
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technical background and their related works. Then, we describe the basic concepts (i.e.
MDVO and identity model) related to the Akogrimo IdM process and the resulting
architecture design. Lastly, we summarize the implementation and validation results.
Motivation
This paper describes the work we have performed within the framework of the research
Project Akogrimo, partially funded by the EC under the FP6-IST programme.
The global objectives and visions of Akogrimo were centred on the notion of the ‘Next
Generation Grid’ (NGG), which is usually described by experts in the field as a result of
an evolution process comprising three complementary dimensions—namely the end-user
perspective, the architecture perspective, and the software perspective (NGGEG 2006).
Akogrimo has addressed also the mobility paradigm as a key aspect of NGGs. Pursuing
a strict service oriented approach, Akogrimo’s NGGs is based on and vertically co-
operates with mobility-enabled IPv6 infrastructures and network related middleware.
Figure 1 shows a two-level view of a typical NGG as envisaged in Akogrimo.
The upper level is related to the user and service perspective: the Mobile User (MU),
belonging to the Customer Domain (CD) that buys services from several SPs, uses
such services participating in a common VO (dotted curve in Fig. 1).
TheNGG can be understood as a large system of nodes providing added-value services
that can be aggregated in an appropriate manner to create new services (e.g. in Fig. 1, the
service owned by SPA is an aggregation of services from SPC, SPD, and SPE.)
The lower level represents the network perspective and it enables the
communications using the added value services at the upper level.
The NPs play a central role and they are considered a specific SP case. In fact,
they provide the basic services to connect the MU with the added-value service to be
consumed.
It is clear that in order to establish an end-to-end communication (from the MU to
the final provider), it is necessary to pass across several domains that due to the
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Fig. 1 Interactions in a NGG
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This requires an IdM system supporting an integrated Authentication and
Authorization (AA) process that allows overcoming the multiplicity of existing
mechanisms discouraging resource sharing and collaboration. In particular, such a
solution has to address the requirements arising from the different parties involved:
& From the user perspective, the primary requirement is simplicity: access to the
resources should not be significantly different from access to a local resource.
& From the perspective of the involved domains, the primary requirement is to
maintain full access control on their services even if they trust the assertions
provided by the federated parties
Related work
Several solutions related to IdM, based on SOA and Grid, exist in a VO environment.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, an integrated solution that takes into account
the different issues arising from a NGG environment is not available. In fact, the
analyzed works provide solutions to specific problems but they do not treat user, service
and network in a comprehensive way. For example: (Mikkonen and Silander 2006)
focuses on porting Liberty alliance concepts to the needs of Grid specific resources;
(Butler et al. 2000) describes specific tools implemented in order to integrate Globus
Security Infrastructure (GSI) mechanisms into applications to be delivered in VO
environments; (Ceccanti et al. 2007) presents a SAML-based service, which is
independent from the underlying Grid middleware and can thus be used to offer VO-
level authorization functionalities in combination with the most popular Grid
middleware. More recent projects have proposed solutions for IdM, in particular, we
refer to TrustCom (Trust 2002) and BEinGRID (Being 2006). Though the work
performed on these projects strongly focus on message level security and they do not
deal with the network dimension integration (that is the focus of this paper), some
specific topics (Gaeta et al. 2008; Maierhofer et al. 2006; Chadwick 2006; Chadwick
et al. 2006a, b) investigated by them are of interests for a possible integration in our
IdM model. This is particularly true for results in (Chadwick et al. 2006a) that deals
with use of attributes coming from multiple authorities, while in our approach SP uses
the attributes it has generated for its users.
Furthermore, projects like PARSIFAL (Pars 2007) conceptually address also the
IdM part, PARSIFAL, in detail however, is conceptually built on top of a currently
deployed mobile network, which is conceptually a layer 2 network rather than a next
generation IP dominated network infrastructure.
This weakness, in terms of integrated solutions, is confirmed in (FGIdM 2007) as
well, which presents an analysis of IdM related use cases in order to identify existing
gaps in today solutions. Analyzing from three different perspectives (user,
application, networking and architecture) the use cases related to the “Integration
of IdM in NGN Architecture” (that is the focus of this paper), and referring to
(FRANGN 2007; FGIdM 2007) identifies a set of gaps. The IdM model, presented
in this paper, addresses some of these gaps and, in particular, proposes:
1. A shared approach for identity authentication among the involved NGN
providers based on the use of A4C and SAML servers. This covers the
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identified lack of specification of a common IdM approach to support multiple
application/services
2. Linking of identities associated to the same user leveraging on the concepts of
principal and digital identities. This addresses the lack of linking among the different
identifiers distributed and used in the various components and layers of the NGN
3. An integrated solution among the different functional layer of the architecture.
This addresses the need for a coordinated and interoperable solution among the
various components of the NGN
Technological background
From a technological viewpoint, the two levels presented in the previous section require
the integration of different IdM related technologies. While the upper level focuses on
application level interactions and it is implemented by leveraging WS technologies, the
lower level is implemented using technologies for IdM related to ND.
In particular, the NP infrastructure leverages the three key building blocks: a).
IETFAAA (AAA Arch 2000) relying on the Diameter protocol (Diameter 2003) that
supports secure communication based on IPSec (IPSec 1998) and Transport Layer
Security (TLS 1999) in intra- and inter-domain scenarios. b). Mobile IPv6 for
mobility management (MIPv6 2008) used as the standard network protocol in
various ‘beyond 3G’ activities such as the Daidalos project (Daida 2005). C). SIP
(Session Initiation Protocol) (SIP 2002) for session handover and signalling.
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the Akogrimo IdM system is designed according
to service oriented principles (OASIS 2006; Rotem 2007) and its implementation is
based on the following specifications: WS-Resource (WSRF1 2006) OASIS standard
enables and standardises interfaces for stateful WSs. WS-Security (WSS 2004) is a
OASIS-Open standard protocol describing how to attach signatures, security tokens,
and encryption headers to SOAP messages. WS-Policy (WSP 2007) is now a W3C
recommendation describing the capabilities and constraints of the security (and other
business) policies on intermediaries and end points.
Lastly, security, at the application level, builds heavily on GT4’s GSI (GlobSec
2006), which allows enabling security at both the transport level and the message level.
Akogrimo IdM: basic concepts
The focus on mobility in a VO required the definition of a specific model (the
MDVO) by the identification of the involved domains and their role, and by the
definition of a suitable Identity Model based on the principal of digital identity
concepts in order to decouple concerns among the different domains of the MDVO.
Mobile Dynamic Virtual Organizations
A MDVO represents a specialization of the VO paradigm (a dynamic collection of
heterogeneous and distributed resources) characterized by members that can join
and/or leave the VO dynamically and that can be nomadic or even mobile. In a
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MDVO, the involved resources are owned and controlled by various administrative
domains; in particular, the MDVO is characterized by five types of domains:
Customer, SP, Network, Base VO (BVO) and Operative VO (OpVO).
Figure 2 shows the high level relations existing between the domains involved in a
MDVO. The BVO is a sort of market place built by all potential SPs that have agreed
on certain formats, constraints and potentially also base contracts for interaction. SPs
advertise their services within the BVO and, through a yellow page-like mechanism,
customers identify potential services meeting their requirements. This is the
preliminary step for triggering (buy service in Fig. 2) the creation of an OpVO using
base services (e.g. discovery, negotiation, ...) situated within the BVO. These services
allow combining concrete services by selected SPs (‘enact service’ in Fig. 2).
The OpVO is the run-time environment for applications that orchestrates services
from different SPs that contribute to the achievement of the initial request of the
customer.
Once the OpVO is setup, a user can start to access the bought Service. Actually
there is not a direct interaction between user and provider (as in Fig. 2) but the end-
to-end communication transparently spans across several domains. This requires the
definition of a suitable identity model taking into account dynamicity, nomadism and
mobility that characterize the MDVO.
It is here, that the NP domain plays a significant role underpinning the MDVO and
providing full support to the transparent end-to-end communication (arrows linking user
and provider domains in Fig. 2). This is achieved by providing network services in
accordance with the service oriented paradigm and leveraging an identity concept that
is able to offer SSO-based services comprising WSs as well as network services.
The Akogrimo Identity Model
In Akogrimo, a user identity is the set of information attributable to a person. A user
uses the identities in order to communicate with other entities. The attributes of the
Fig. 2 Relations among administrative domains
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users (users identity) are stored either in the home domain or in a SP domain or in
the VO domain. Some of these attributes are considered to be of a generic nature and
consist of personal user information (e.g. name, sex, age etc.). Other attributes are
related to the SP domain of a user and contains information like policies to be
applied after a user logs in. The personal user information and home domain specific
attributes are stored inside the home domain of a user. A further subset of attributes
contains service-specific information. This set of attributes can be stored either in the
home domain or in the related domain that provides the service.
In Akogrimo, dynamic representation of a user’s identity (within this context the
notion identity comprises the attributes assigned to an identity) is foreseen. The
detailed representation of the attribute is selected/approved by the user. Within a VO
however, policies might require a certain representation. This personalization is
performed at the BVO subscription in a very straightforward manner. The identity
profiles are stored at the Participant Registry (PR) of the VO to which the user is
subscribed. It is foreseen, that the user can act based on various identities, which is
conceptually similar to the scenario where different users are acting.
Figure 3 shows the Akogrimo IdM concept from a BVO perspective. When a user
subscribes to a BVO, the VO Manager (VOM) adds the user’s profile in the PR of
the BVO, which is then acknowledged. The key building blocks are the A4C
System, the Registry, the BVO Manager and the Admin portal. In the A4C system, a
user is represented and all personal attributes are attached to the user. In the Registry,
the user is represented as well, but here, SP specific attributes, which should be
transparent to the logical function of an Identity Provider are represented. In order to
integrate a new user in the VO, a registration in both building blocks is required.
Authorization requests like those from the Policy Management Systems are later
sent to the PR and can be answered. Furthermore, A4C servers are statically (within
the BVO instantiation phase) configured in a way that they can be seen as a trusted
‘community’ where new members are not integrated into the communication
scenario. By using the standard IETF AAA security mechanisms, all involved A4C
(Authentication, Authorization, Auditing, Accounting, Charging) Systems have the
ability to dynamically exchange profile information between the PR and Home A4C
Fig. 3 Akogrimo identity model
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Servers—each time, the user’s profile changes during his VO membership either at the
A4C or at the PR; the other component will be informed about that event by the VOM.
The architecture of the Akogrimo IdM subsystem
Figure 4 shows the Akogrimo IdM subsystem architecture. It is distributed among
the MDVO domains and it is centred on the federation of A4C servers hosted in each
domain for supporting the authentication process.
While the authentication is managed through a federated process, each domain
authorizes the use of its own service according to the attributes associated to the user
identity and stored in the domain itself.
The BVO/OpVO infrastructure
Figure 4 shows the components of the IdM system belonging to the BVO/OpVO
domain (AkoD443 2006). It is worth noticing that the OpVO is a transient instance
of a VO and will need the same components that allow the management of the BVO.
Registries
The Participant Registry (PR) provides all manner of information about BVO/OpVO
participants. A participant is assigned with an identifier and it is represented using a
WS-Resource of the PR that will store information about their status. Each entity
living within the VO will have an associated WS-Resource.
Managers
The VO Manager (VOM) interacts as a ‘mediator’ between the PRs, A4C server,

































Fig. 4 Akogrimo IdM architecture
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OpVO pass through the VOM that requests the A4C to authenticate the requestor
through the federated A4C network.
While the authentication is delegated to the A4C, the VOM uses information from
the Policy Manager (PM) to make a decision on authorization the request.
The PM presents the VO with a stable set of policies and services organized in a
hierarchical tree architecture. The result of a query is an aggregation of policies
related to the same subject distributed across the tree.
Agents
The UA/Service Agent (SA) represents the user/service inside the VO. The UA
provides a standard front-end to be invoked from the outside and it is the Policy
Enforcement Point to control accesses to the BVO/OpVO services. The SA
transparently conveys the right credentials to use the respective service in the
external SP domain.
The SP infrastructure
The basic role of the SP Infrastructure is to manage the execution of the services on
request of the MDVO Infrastructure, aiming to fulfil the Grid requirements,
addressing the performance issues in a transparent way to the client and conforming
to the determined Service Level Agreement (SLA). The services one can encounter
in the Akogrimo SP Infrastructure, apart from the business services that are actually
offered to the Akogrimo clients, are listed below:
Execution Management group of services (EMS)
EMS was developed on the basis of the OGSA and WSRF (WSRF2 2004;
WSRF1 2006) specifications using Globus Toolkit version 4 (GT4) (Globus 2006).
It is therefore responsible for finding execution candidate locations, selecting the one
most suitable, as well as, preparing, initiating and monitoring the execution of a
business service. Although, from the client’s perspective, it appears to be a single
Grid service, the EMS is a composition of the six Grid services listed below:
1. Core service, which acts as a gateway service that offers a single-point of
access to the EMS whilst ‘hiding’ its details and complexity from the clients.
2. Advertisement service, which is used by the SPs to advertise their services in
the EMS’s index service. The SPs run a client on their local machines,
providing all information necessary to form the advertisement of the service.
3. Negotiation service, which is responsible for interpreting requests for the
negotiation of the terms of the client’s SLA contracts.
4. Reservation service, which is in charge of performing advance reservation
on the resources needed for the execution as well as the monitoring of it.
5. Discovery service, which is responsible for finding available services that
meet the SLA’s QoS parameters. It is designed to follow rules based on low-
level performance parameters.
6. Execution service, which coordinates the SLA Enforcement and Monitoring
group of services and the actual execution of the service.
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Monitoring group of services
EMS works closely together with the Monitoring group of services that consists
of the following three Grid services:
1. Metering service, which maintains run-time information on the performance
parameters related to the business service execution.
2. QoS Broker service, which is a network broker that handles QoS network
requests, and is also responsible for monitoring network parameters.
3. Monitoring service, receives notifications about the values of the QoS
parameters during execution.
SLA Enforcement group of services
The SLA Enforcement group is composed of the following three Grid services:
1. SLA-Access service, which provides access to the SLAs.
2. SLA-Controller service, which is responsible for comparing measured QoS
parameters against the thresholds defined in the SLA and communicates
possible violations to the SLA-Decider service.
3. SLA-Decider service, which is responsible for the management of the violations
that may occur and decides on the corrective action that should be taken.
More information on their functionality and implementation can be found in
(AkoD433 2006; Litke et al. 2008). A high-level overview of services that reside in
the Akogrimo SP domain is depicted in Fig. 5.
The Akogrimo authentication & authorization mechanism
The IdM system is designed to reduce as much as possible the end-user intervention.
Figure 6 shows that the end user is initially authenticated by the network (and
authorized to access it), then the request passes through the UA and SA within the
OpVO domain (the behaviour is similar in the BVO) that authorizes the end-user to
use the requested service, finally, the request is forwarded to the actual services in
the SP domain that will authorize the OpVO/BVO to access their internal resources
in order to satisfy the end user request.
The following subsections will explain in more detail how the different
components interact to accomplish the end-to-end communications.
Access to the network
Network access is the first task than is performed in the Akogrimo bootstrap process.
During this phase, the user is authenticated by the AAA Server of his ‘home’ domain
and an ID token is issued. The authentication performed during network login is
based on a username and password and is encapsulated in EAP (Extensible
Authentication Protocol) (EAP 1998). For the transport between the mobile end-
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system and the network authentication server, PANA (PANA 2008) is used. For the
transport between the network authentication server and the AAA server, the
Diameter protocol is used. The following figure shows the network access procedure
in detail (Fig. 7).
The mobile terminal (MT) acts as a PANA Client that communicates with the
Access Router (AR) via the PANA protocol. The AR communicates with the A4C














Fig. 6 End user requests across the MDVO domains
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server via the Diameter protocol. The communication starts with the PANA-PAA-
Discover message sent by the MT to find available ARs. The AR sends a PANA-
Start-Request containing information about the network provider. In turn, the MT
selects a network provider from the list and sends its selection back to the AR in the
PANA-Start-Answer.
The AR forwards the user’s identity to the A4C server in the Diameter-EAP-Request
(DEAR) message. The A4C server replies with a Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA). The
challenge is forwarded to the MT in the PANA-Auth-Request. The MT replies to the
challenge in the PANA-Auth-Request. The AR forwards the message with the answer to
the challenge to the A4C server, which verifies the identity of the user.
If the authentication is successful, the A4C server requests the generation of an
IDToken from the SAML Authority. Then, the A4C Server sends the IDToken, the
user’s public identities and VO parameters to the AR encapsulated in the DEA. The
information is forwarded to the MT that finally replies with a PANA-Bind-Answer,
which closes the authentication process.
Access to the MDVO
Figure 8 shows the AA process related to the invocation of a UA instance.
The SOAP Filter (SF) receives the incoming SOAP message (SM) and parses it to
extract the SAMLID token and the claimed digital identity (1). These parameters are








Fig. 7 Network access procedure
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Then, the VOM asks (3) the A4C within the OpVO domain to authenticate the
identity. This is done checking the signature of SAMLID token and invoking the
trusted A4C server to check the validity of the issued token.
The response (6) of this validation authenticates the principal identity of the user
and guarantees that this user is the owner of the claimed digital identity (notice that
there is a one-to-many relation between principal identity and digital identity).
The VOM retrieves (11) the profile associated with this identity from the PR and
uses such a profile to receive (13) from the Policy Manager the policies (defined
using WS-Policy specifications) to be applied for authorizing the request.
According to the decision taken (15) by the VOM, the SF allows the request to be
processed by the UA instance (19) or blocks it (18).
Figure 9 shows the AA process between two generic services inside the VO.
These interactions are still valid if the generic services are replaced by UA and SA.
On creation, these services are associated with a VO token signed by VOM. It is
assumed that VOService1 invokes Method() on VOService2.
Figure 9 highlights that the authorization sequence is similar to that shown in
Fig. 8, the only difference being the authentication process (2). In fact, in this case,
the A4C server is not involved because communications are among entities within
Fig. 8 End user AA
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the same VO domain and the VOM operates as a certification authority that issues
the credentials to be conveyed by the requestors in their messages to be
authenticated.
Invoking a service
For the development of the SAs and the SP’s Grid Services, two of the most
popular platforms in the development of Grid Services were used: GT4 and
WSRF.NET (WSRF.NET 2006), both of which are a full implementation of WSRF
specifications.
The SAwas a WSRF.NET client to the EMS Core service that acted as a gateway
service in front of the SP Infrastructure and their communications were made using
SOAP over the HTTP protocol. In order to establish secure SOAP communications
between the SA and the SP domain, WSRF was linked to the WS-Security
specifications and GT4’s Security Infrastructure (GSI) was plugged into the
Akogrimo security mechanisms.
Authentication
In more detail, the security header of the SOAP request coming from the SAs
contained an SAML security token. This SAML token was presented to the EMS
Core service. Next, the authentication decision was delegated to the A4C Server that
in turn contacted an OGSA-compliant SAML server.
Fig. 9 AA between services inside the VO
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Authorization
Having authenticated against the SAML server, the EMS Core service checked the
request against its gridMap. If the SA was listed in the gridMap, i.e. the SA was
mapped to an account; the EMS Core Service proceeded with the invocation of the
specific EMS sub-service. As already explained, the gridMap is used as an access
control list. In more detail, during the reservation of the required resources, a
persistent WS-Resource was created after each successful reservation inside which
all the information that is needed in order to execute the reserved services was
stored. For each reservation, an entry was added in the EMS sub-service’s gridMap
specifying the SA and the WS-resource that corresponded to the reservation. Upon
receiving an execution request by an SA, the EMS sub-service checked its own
gridMap in order to check if the client that is behind the SA is allowed to access the
specific resources in the SP domain. In this way, all EMS services made sure that
only the client, who had negotiated and reserved the resources, could actually access
them. By doing so, other authenticated clients were prevented from tampering with
another client’s reserved resources.
It should be noted that the usage and maintenance of gridMap files entries does
not scale very well as the number of clients increases. In this direction, the EMS
services were able to easily expand onto other nodes in the SP domain to
accommodate the increased number of clients. In more detail, when the number of
entries in the gridMap file of an EMS service exceeded a threshold, the EMS service
was able to delegate its request to another available instance of the same EMS
service running on another node or server with fewer clients.
The steps required to invoke a service in terms of authentication-authorization of
the SA against the SP domain are depicted in the following sequence diagram
(Fig. 10).
Demonstration scenario
The Akogrimo IdM was used in two mission-critical scenarios in public
demonstrations. The first scenario was eHealth which focused on heart monitoring
whereas the other was in a disaster handling and crisis management (DHCM)
scenario in which the eHealth scenario was combined with an overall crisis
management. IdM was fundamental in both scenarios since the resources and
services that formed the Mobile VO were collected from a wide range of
heterogeneous and geographically distributed resources both mobile and non-
mobile. Furthermore, the mission critical nature of the scenarios imposed heavy
requirements on the performance of the involved services as well as the overall
performance of the Akogrimo platform.
The DHCM scenario and the related demonstration are discussed next.
Scenario description
The overall setting of the demonstration is a terrorist attack in the centre of a major
city, namely the explosion of a ‘dirty bomb’. The management of such situations
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requires the coordinated collaboration among different entities (paramedic, police
officer, fire fighter,...) and the integrated use of different capabilities (camera, video/
audio communication, data evaluation,...). It requires setting up a VO that due to the
strong focus on dynamicity and mobility has all the characteristics of a MDVO (see
Fig. 11).
The realized prototype is a very rich setting that, with the mobile terminals,
networks with quality of service capabilities, vertical context awareness, accounting
capabilities, MDVO creation and management, allowed the evaluation of the
usability of the Akogrimo IdM model in a simplified real case.
Evaluation results
Having presented the feasibility of the Akogrimo’s IdM infrastructure, we present
indicative time measurements that have been taken during the demonstrations with
respect to its overall performance. Time measurements were performed during the
execution phase with security deactivated and activated respectively.
A set of 15 PCs with similar technical characteristics (Pentium V 1.7 GHz, 1 GB
of memory, 10 Mb/s Ethernet segment) were used during the demonstrations. All
EMS subservices were deployed on the same PC and ran under the same GT4
container. The tests were performed using up to ten different WSRF services that
encapsulated the business logic behind the demonstration scenario, developed on the
GT4 platform. The Table 1 presents the average response time (in seconds) for
authenticating the execution of services where the number of concurrent execution
requests bas been equal to 1, 10 and 50.
EMS Core
Service
Invoke execute operation with 

























If the SA is 
authenticated
If the SA is 
authorized
Fig. 10 Authentication/authorization of SA against SP domain
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where:
T_net elapsed time between receiving an execution request and authenticating
against the Akogrimo network
T_mdvo time spent for the process of authentication/authorization against the
MDVO
T_sp elapsed time between receiving an execution request by a Agent and
authenticating against the Service Provider domain
and consequently:
T_total = T_net + T_mdvo +
T_sp
total time for authentication and authorization of
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Fig. 11 DHCM demonstrator scenario
Table 1 Results of the experiments (measured in seconds)
Security # requests T_net T_mdvo T_sp T_total
Deactivated 1 0.12 0.23 0.45 0.80
10 2.03 2.97 3.10 8.10
50 7.40 9.02 11.78 28.02
Activated 1 0.45 1.02 2.45 3.92
10 3.07 4.56 10.87 18.5
50 10.34 15.34 25.36 51.04
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By comparing the results shown in the table above, some very valuable
conclusions can be extracted. As we can see, although it can be considered that
the performance scales relatively well as the number of execution requests increases,
the Akogrimo IdM adds a significant overhead to the overall performance of the
platform during the execution phase. After further investigation, we came to the
conclusion that a significant percentage of the added overhead is due to the relatively
slow performance of the WS-security related mechanisms against the SP domain.
Consequently, as the workload increases, the overall performance of the system
might be considered too slow. However, it should be taken into account that the
EMS family of services were hosted on the same container which slowed down its
performance drastically. Apart from distributing the EMS services across different
hosts, another way to improve the overall performance of the system is to introduce
new instances of the EMS using a lower threshold for the maximum execution
requests as already explained in Section “Invoking a Service”. This will allow for
delegating the execution requests to other nodes with fewer requests outstanding and
will result in a better work-load balancing and improved overall performance.
Implementation issues
The implementation pointed out some issues related to the integration of the
involved technologies and the interoperability between the heterogeneous domains.
Due to the requirements for domains’ heterogeneity, two of the most popular
middleware products were used to develop WSRF-complaint services: Globus
Toolkit 4 (GT4) and WSRF .NET. For example, while the EMS and the Monitoring
group of services were developed on GT4, all the services in the SLA Enforcement
group were developed using the WSRF.NET platform.
It was noticed that, although the WSRF.NET platform is no longer maintained,
the presented results are still valuable and up-to-date. In fact:
& The designed architecture is independent of the specific implementation and
therefore the proof-of-concepts are still valid even when using alternative
technologies.
& Even if the tests were performed using WSRF.NET and the identified solutions
are implementation specific, the know-how gained does have a general validity
in order to identify the source of interoperability issues independently from the
underlying technical implementation.
Integration
The integration issues arise from the need to join the technologies used to secure
network and message level protocols in order to distribute authentication information
from the network to the VO domain. The component playing the role of interface is the
A4C server. In fact, on one side it authenticates MUs accessing the network using
network protocols (EAP, PANA, Diameter), whilst on the other side it integrates a
SAML authority in order to distribute SAML tokens (used by the MU) and SAML
based authentication assertions about the MU that requests services in the MDVO.
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The A4C server represents the glue between the network and the VO domain.
Again, in fact, it leverages the SAML authority in order to generate assertions
understandable at the VO level and makes them available via the WS interface and
SOAP standard communications.
Interoperability
At the design level, interoperability among heterogeneous domains is achieved
through virtualization of features using the SOA paradigm, implemented with WS
technologies. The Akogrimo service-oriented infrastructure allows checking whether
the selected popular WSRF development tools, GT4 and WSRF.NET, implement the
WSRF and WS-related specifications in a transparent and interoperable way. During
the establishment of communications between them, several inconsistencies were
detected and were handled in different ways and at different levels with some of
them even requiring changing the form of the SOAP messages that were generated
by the services.
It should be noted that interoperability problems were encountered not only in the
implementation of the WSRF specifications but also in other related specifications
that were used such as the WS-BaseNotification specification. Although the WSRF
and GT4 services were able to successfully subscribe to one another, problems were
detected upon the reception of a WSRF.NET notification message from a GT4
service. Following investigations, the problem was found to be related to the
different structure of the SOAP notification message that produced errors during
processing by the GT4 related parsers and Java classes. In order to overcome this
issue, new classes for processing WSRF.NET notification messages were developed.
A large number of specific tests were also required in order to verify the
interoperability between GT4 and WSRF.NET with respect to security management.
For this purpose, each service that was used in the tests was configured to use the
Platform-specific authentication mechanisms. All tests were made with respect to the
X.509 certificates by the OpenCA and each service had obtained a digital certificate
from the this CA and used it for authentication purposes by embedding it in the
SOAP message using the implementation of the WS-Security, WS-
SecureConversation and TLS specifications of the respective WSRF frameworks.
Conclusions
IdM is a challenging problem for management of a large scale VO.
Although a wide variety of solutions have been offered to address the key issues of
IdM, the presentedwork provides a comprehensive view integrating different approaches
focusing on two main perspectives: network and service level. In fact, the existing
solutions mainly address the problem from a service level viewpoint without providing a
unified view of the different parties involved in the service provision in a VO.
The presented IdM system overcomes this weakness providing an integrated
design covering all the participants of the MDVO. The initial demonstration proved
the functionalities of the implemented prototype, identifying and solving integration
and interoperability problems.
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These experimental results represent an important step towards extended testing
that should evaluate the performance of the developed solution and the potential
vulnerability with respect to an identified attack model suitable for the MDVO
environment.
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